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This report explores the relationship beteen disability and poverty among 
the older population. It emphasises the additional living costs that disabled 
people face, and the importance of taking disability costs into account 
hen making poverty assessments in the older population. The report 
considers alternative directions of reform for the system of public support 
for older people ith disabilities and casts doubt on some of the 
suggestions that have been made for improving the targeting of public 
support for older disabled people. 
The report shos that: 
 
• effective targeting does not necessarily require an extension of means-testing; 
• the present benefit/social care system is reasonably ell-targeted, but falls far short of full support 
for the most severely disabled; 
• there is a case for tailoring the structure of disability benefits more closely to the severity of 
disability; 
• there is a need for caution in considering proposals that ould scrap national disability benefits in 
favour of an expansion of local authority social care funding. 
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Summary of main conclusions 
This study uses statistical analysis of to large-scale representative surveys to examine the effectiveness 
of public support for older people ith disabilities. e have also simulated a number of illustrative 
hypothetical policy reforms to suggest promising ays to reform the system ithin the existing level of 
government spending. There are six main conclusions.  
1. Disability brings ith it additional living costs, hich can be very large – sometimes hundreds of 
pounds a eek. People ith disabilities often receive government support in the form of 
disability benefit, designed to meet part of those additional costs. If e include disability benefit in 
income but fail to make any alloance for the higher living costs that disability brings, then 
disabled people appear to be better off than they actually are. In the policy debate, e often see 
comparisons beteen the incomes of disabled and non-disabled people, or of the younger and 
older population (the latter have higher rates of disability). These comparisons are often made 
ithout any alloance for differences in living costs and are misleading because they make older 
disabled people seem better off relative to the rest of the population than they really are. 
2. Britain currently has a dual system of public support for older disabled people. Central 
government pays disability benefits (mainly ttendance lloance and Disability Living 
lloance), hile local authorities manage the provision of social care services. The to systems 
are quite separate and have little overlap, and it is sometimes suggested that they should be 
merged into a single system of disability support. hile this sounds neater and may save some 
administrative costs, it runs the risk that many more people may miss out on government 
support completely. e think it is too big a risk to take ith such a vulnerable group. 
3. The present system of social care/disability benefit is quite good at using limited resources to 
minimise the number of older disabled people in poverty. But it is much less effective in 
protecting people from very deep poverty. The people most affected by this are those ith 
severe disability (and therefore high disability costs), especially those ho are unaare of, or not 
able to negotiate, the systems for claiming help ith their care needs.  
4. There are failures in the targeting of the current system – the system misses some people in 
great need and it spends some public money on people ith only moderate needs. But, in 
practice, no system of social support can avoid all such errors. Our findings suggest that the 
failure to meet severe need is a much bigger source of targeting error in the current system 
than is the spending of resources on the rong people. 
5. There is scope for improving the performance of the system of public support for older people 
ith disabilities, by spending the current budget for disability benefit in a more effective ay. 
lthough introducing means-testing for ttendance lloance or Disability Living lloance is 
often suggested, it is possible to achieve similar improvements in poverty outcomes in a fully 
means-tested or a fully non-means-tested version of the disability benefit system. The reason 
for this is that people ith lo incomes are more likely to be affected by severe disability, and 
also have a stronger need for support and are therefore more likely to claim support. 
6. Much more important than means-testing is the ability of the system to provide support to 
people living ith severe disabilities and facing very high disability costs. Effective reforms of the 
disability benefit system could achieve major reductions in the burden of deep poverty by doing 
to things: 
• adapting the amounts of benefit paid to claimants of ttendance lloance or Disability Living 
lloance to match the costs of disability more closely; 
 
• increasing the reach of the system, particularly among the most disabled, by increasing take-up 
of entitlements and/or improving the quality of initial adjudication of claims. 
 
 reform that achieved these objectives hile staying inside the current level of spending on disability 
benefit ould require a reduction in the average amounts paid to people ith less severe disability, to pay 
for the increased levels of support for the most severely disabled, although it could also accommodate 
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small amounts of support to an increased proportion of those ith modest disability levels. This seems a 
reasonable possibility to examine. 
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1 Introduction 
Pensioner poverty is in the nes again. This time, not because of concerns about the extent of poverty 
among older people, but because of concerns that older people are being unreasonably sheltered from 
recent economic hardships relative to the young. This ne concern springs partly from comparisons of 
pensioner incomes and poverty rates ith those in the non-pensioner population. For example, David 
illetts MP has emphasised this issue, citing evidence from the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) that 
median pensioner income has no overtaken median income in the rest of the population. 1 These 
concerns may be ell-founded for a significant part of the pensioner population, but pensioners are not 
a homogeneous group and it is important to be careful in comparing the incomes of pensioners and non-
pensioners. Disability is a major complication affecting such comparisons, but it is routinely ignored by 
policy-makers and commentators (including the IFS). Disability is particularly prevalent in the older 
population and it has to effects that distort income comparisons: it often generates large additional 
costs of living; and it also triggers payment of additional income through the disability benefit system. 
Traditional income analysis ignores the extra costs of living caused by disability but includes in income the 
benefit payments hich are designed to help ith those extra costs. It therefore gives a distorted picture, 
by making people affected by disability appear better off than they really are. 
 
In our vie, it is not possible to dra meaningful conclusions about incomes in the older population 
ithout making explicit alloance for disability. By causing very large increases in the cost of living for 
those affected, disability increases inequality and poverty, making summary measures like average or 
median income very unreliable as indicators of the economic elfare of pensioners. Our aim here is to 
look at pensioner poverty in Britain, taking those extra personal disability costs fully into account. 
 
The picture e paint here of disability and poverty in the older population is necessarily fragmentary to 
some degree. Most of the available survey evidence relates to the household population and excludes 
people living in care homes and other institutions. There are also geographical limitations. Some of our 
evidence relates to England only, other sources relate to Great Britain. For that reason, it is not possible 
to give a full picture at the UK level, although e are confident that our main conclusions are applicable 
to the UK as a hole. It is also not possible to assess fully ho the picture varies across the constituent 
countries of the UK. e discuss this further in section 6. 
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2 The current system of disability 
support for older people 
Britain has a dual system of public support for older people ith disabilities: a nationally-administered 
system of cash benefits2, and locally-administered systems of social care provision.3 The to parts of the 
system are essentially independent and are administered on rather different principles.  
 
Disability benefits  
In Britain, older disabled people may receive cash benefits to help ith the additional costs that their 
disabilities bring. There are to types of disability benefit. The first type is non-means-tested and tax 
free. It comprises either ttendance lloance () hich can be claimed from age 65 or Disability Living 
lloance (DL) hich must be claimed before reaching age 65 but can continue in payment beyond 65 
(see Hancock et al, 2012 for a comparison of  and DL recipients). From pril 2013 DL is gradually 
being replaced by the Personal Independence Payment (PIP), hich differs from  and DL in certain 
details but like DL is claimed before age 65 and then continues in payment beyond 65; very fe over-
65s are currently receiving PIPs. In 2015–16,  is orth £55.10 or £82.30 per eek, depending on the 
assessed level of need, hile DL can vary in the range £21.80 to £139.75.  and DL have 
considerable reach: in February 2015, there ere 0.96 million DL recipients aged 65 and over, and 1.6 
million  recipients4, comprising respectively 8 per cent and 14 per cent of the over-65 population in 
Britain. 
 
Claims for  or DL/PIP are made to the Department for ork and Pensions (DP) in Great Britain, 
and there is a to-stage process of reconsideration and appeal against DP decisions on claims for 
these benefits. The procedure for challenging DP decisions is a formal national-level process ith (in 
principle) no local variation. 
 
In addition to providing flat eekly income supplements,  and DL also act as a gateay to increases in 
the levels of a further group of means-tested disability benefits, Pension Credit (PC), Housing Benefit 
(HB) and Council Tax Support (CTS).5 These increases come about through a Severe Disability ddition 
(SD) to the presumed level of need hich determines PC, HB and CTS entitlements. The SD is 
triggered by receipt of  or DL/PIP, subject to certain other conditions. This link to further means-
tested benefits means that people on lo incomes (ho ould satisfy the means test) have a particularly 
strong incentive to claim  or DL/PIP. The /DL/PIP/PC/HB/CTB benefit system is extremely 
complex and is described in more detail in ppendix 1. 
 
Social care  
The reach of the social care system is much less than that of the disability benefit system. The number of 
older people in the household population receiving long-term local authority social care in England at 31 
March 2015 as 254,000. If e include provision of local authority support to people in care homes, this 
figure rises to 411,000 – just 4.2 per cent of the total population in England aged 65+.6 
 
Social care in England7 is organised by local authorities ho assess individuals’ needs for care. ny 
resident (or their carer) has the right to request a needs assessment, hich is normally carried out by a 
social orker or occupational therapist. Before pril 2015, that assessment classified any care needs into 
one of four bands: lo, moderate, substantial or critical. The 2014 Care ct has established a national 
minimum standard for eligibility, in force since pril 2015, intended to be equivalent to the old 
‘substantial’ needs category. This specifies a level of need having a significant impact on ellbeing by 
preventing the achievement of at least to out of a list of ten basic outcomes.8 Under the old system, 
there as some variation across local authorities in the ay that the four bands of need ere interpreted 
and used in deciding eligibility.  
 
In England and ales, local authorities apply a means test to determine claimants’ contributions to the 
cost of the care they are assessed as needing. In Scotland, there is a non-means-tested public subsidy for 
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personal care costs (means-tested charges are levied for ‘hotel’ costs in care homes and non-personal 
care provided at home). In England and ales, local authorities have some discretion over the form of 
the means test for care provided to people in their on homes but national guidance determines the 
principles they must follo and implicitly the maximum charge, given income and ealth.9 ppendix 2 
gives a more detailed description of the social care means tests. 
People applying for, or already receiving, local authority social care have rights to challenge decisions and 
resolve problems ithin a national frameork provided by the 2014 Care ct. Nevertheless, the system 
for challenge and redress is much less formal than the system of reconsideration and appeal for disability 
benefits, and local authorities have considerable freedom to implement the complaints process in their 
on ay. ppendix 2 gives further details. 
 
ith increasing pressure on their budgets, many local authorities ithdre support from the loer bands 
and are no only able to support people ith high levels of assessed need (Fernandez et al. 2013). The 
number of older people ho receive local authority-sponsored social care services has been declining 
over the last decade, despite the increase in the number of over-65s ith care needs. For the over-65 
household population in England, the number of recipients of local authority social care fell from 
645,000 in 2005/6 to 418,000 in 2012/1310 (Fernandez et al., 2013; MacInnes et al., 2015). Future 
demands on the disability support system are likely to rise. It has been projected that the number of older 
people in England needing help ith at least one activity of daily living ill rise from 1.15 million in 2015 
to 2 million in 2035 (ittenberg and Hu, 2015). nalysis of disability trends for successive birth cohorts 
by socio-economic status suggests stability of disability rates for better-off people, but a strongly rising 
trend of disability for population groups ith relatively lo incomes (see Morciano et al., 2015). This 
suggests that the demand for public support may rise faster than the number of older people ith 
disabilities. 
 
Overlap of the social care and disability benefit systems  
Evidence from survey data suggests a surprisingly modest degree of overlap of the to systems. Table 1, 
based on information from the nationally representative Family Resources Survey, suggests that over a 
third of local authority social care recipients get no disability benefit at all, and only a third receive 
higher-rate aards of  or DL. (There is some evidence of under-reporting of receipt of elfare 
benefits in survey data, and this may cause the degree of overlap to be underestimated. In our vie, this 
measurement problem is unlikely to make a substantial difference to the conclusion here.) 
 
Table 1:  significant minority of local authority social care clients receive no 
disability benefit, and only a third receive higher-rate aards 
 
 
Local authority-funded 
social care 
ll over-65s 
Recipients Non- recipients 
% receiving no /DL 35% 87% 85% 
% receiving lo-rate DL 2% 1% 1% 
% receiving standard-rate 
/DL 30% 6% 7% 
% receiving higher-rate /DL 33% 6% 6% 
Estimated proportions based on analysis of data on individuals aged over 65 in Great Britain, from the Family Resources Survey, 
2003/4– 2007/8. Figures are rounded to the nearest hole percentage point.   
Table 2 looks at the proportion of people at each level of /DL aard ho also receive local authority 
social care. Even among recipients of high-rate  or DL (ho are presumably the most severely 
disabled), no more than 13 per cent report receiving any help through local authority social care. This is 
partly due to the means test imposed on claims for social care, but non-take-up is also likely to be a 
significant factor. In terms of the number of people receiving help, the social care system is small relative 
to the disability benefit system (although the amounts paid out in social care may be much larger in some 
cases). 
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Table 2: Even among people receiving the highest rate of  or DL, only just over 
1 in 8 receives any local authority social care 
 
Disability benefit receipt % receiving local authority social care 
No AA/DLA 1% 
Low-rate DLA 7% 
Standard-rate AA/DLA 11% 
Higher-rate AA/DLA 13% 
Estimated proportions based on analysis of data on individuals 
aged over 65 in Great Britain, from the Family Resources Survey, 
2003/4-2007/8. Figures are rounded to the nearest whole 
percentage point. 
 
This separation of the to systems has suggested to some commentators that there are potential 
administrative savings to be made by integrating the to into a single system of social care, either 
locally or nationally administered. On the other hand – and this has rarely been mentioned in policy 
discussions – the availability of to separate sources of support may be an advantage in increasing 
the reach of the system, since potential claimants may miss one entry point to the system but still be 
able to get support via another. e discuss this and related issues in section 5. 
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3 hat do e mean by poverty? 
Poverty is a difficult concept. For the most part, in this report e use methods for measuring poverty 
hich are quite standard in the research literature; ppendix 5 gives details. But there are some 
important considerations hich arise in relation to disability and hich are overlooked in most policy 
discussion of poverty and inequality. There are four specific issues that need to be addressed. 
 
Ho should e define and measure economic elfare?  
Poverty is typically measured in terms of lo income. But this idea has been challenged by participants in 
policy debates, not least by the UK government, hich has introduced ne measures for monitoring 
subjective ellbeing; consulted on an abortive proposal for a multi-dimensional approach to (child) 
poverty measurement; and developed an index of material deprivation among pensioners.11 lthough 
there are poerful intellectual and practical advantages in broadening poverty measures beyond the 
traditional focus on income, these approaches involve substantial difficulties of their on and there is, as 
yet, no consensus in their favour.  
 
 particular advantage of income-based analysis is that it links directly ith the main strands of public 
policy, hich involve transfers of income, either in cash disability benefits, or in cash-equivalent form of 
care services (hich are increasingly purchased ithin the frameork of an approved personal care 
budget). Because of this strong advantage, e use a conventional income-poverty approach, but ith 
extensions to adapt it to the special context of an older population characterised by a high rate of 
disability prevalence.  
 
e measure income as an equivalised net amount after housing costs. One unusual feature related to 
disability deserves comment here. e include in income an estimate of the value of any subsidy on care 
services hich are supplied under the auspices of the local authority social care system or the NHS. To 
see hy this is appropriate, compare an individual  ho is given a cash benefit and uses it to buy a given 
amount of care services ith another identical person B ho is directly provided ith the same bundle of 
care services. Both individuals reach the same level of elfare, but a conventional income measure 
restricted to cash income only ould suggest – rongly – that person B is poorer than person . So it is 
important for us to include in income the market value of any public subsidy on care services. The 
valuation of care services is uncertain, but has been estimated by the Personal Social Services Research 
Unit. Uprated to 2015/16 prices, e take them as averaging £24.70 an hour of home visits by a care 
orker, and £67.80 an hour for home visits by NHS nursing staff.12 t these unit costs, severe disability 
can lead to additional living costs that are far higher than average pension incomes, so their inclusion in 
income has a large impact for some households. ll references to local authority social care relate to the 
value of local authority subsidies on care services, rather than the value of the care package as a hole. 
 
To estimate the subsidy, e value the total amount of local authority-sponsored care services reported 
by a survey respondent and simulate the orking of the local authority social care means test to estimate 
the amount the local authority requires the recipient to pay toards their care package. That amount is 
then subtracted to give the value of the local authority care subsidy. Box 1 gives to hypothetical 
examples of ho this orks 
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Box 1: Hypothetical example of local authority mean-testing* 
 
Jill has income £400 per eek and no significant financial assets. She has critical care needs assessed as 
14 hours of help from a care assistant, costed by the local authority at £24.70 an hour, giving a total cost 
for the care package of £345.80 a eek.  
 
The Guarantee Credit level for a single person is £151.20 a eek, and she must be left ith at least 125 
per cent of this amount (£189 per eek) after contributing to the cost of the care package. 
Consequently, she ill be required to pay £211 a eek (= £400 - £189) toards the cost of care. 
So the local authority care subsidy to Jill ill be £134.80 (= £345.80 - £211). 
 
Jack has exactly the same income and assessed care needs, but has savings of £30,000. The first 
£23,250 of this is disregarded, but the remaining £6,750 is assumed to yield an additional income of 
£27, making £427 per eek actual and notional income. He ill be required to pay £238 (= £427 - 
£189) toards his care, so the local authority subsidy to Jack ill be £107.80 (= £345.80 – £238). 
*These examples ignore complications over the treatment of any /DL hich the individual receives 
(see ppendix 6f). 
 
 
hat additional living costs do people ith disabilities 
face?  
dditional disability-related costs may include care needs, for example help ith getting into and out of 
bed, bathing, cleaning, gardening, shopping and cooking. Transport may become more difficult meaning 
normal functioning requires the use of taxis rather than buses. There may also be a need for adaptations 
of the home, such as installation of stairlifts, hoists or bathing facilities. There is a long history of research 
on the additional living costs linked to disability. Much of this ork uses small-scale in-depth qualitative 
enquiry to evaluate the impact that various disabilities can have on individual lives. Other research has 
used survey-based quantitative methods hich focus on the impact that various types of disability have 
on measures of ellbeing or material living standards. ppendix 4 revies some of the UK estimates that 
appear in the research literature and explains the approach e use for estimating disability costs at the 
individual level. Differences in both the measurement and definition of disability costs mean that these 
estimates cover a very ide range. In our vie, any estimate of disability cost should be treated ith 
caution. For that reason, e explore the robustness of our estimates in section 7. 
 
In very broad terms, our method orks in the folloing ay. e make a detailed statistical analysis 
explaining the indicators of disability and material living standards that e observe for individual survey 
respondents, in relation to their income and other characteristics. This model allos us to compare any 
disabled individual ith an otherise identical non-disabled individual ho manages to reach the same 
living standard. Since the disabled person has higher living costs, the income they needed to reach that 
common standard of living ill have been higher than the income needed by the comparable non-
disabled person. Their income difference then tells us the level of disability cost faced by the disabled 
individual. 
 
Personal disability costs make a big difference to income comparisons and consequently to any 
assessment of income inequality ithin the older population. One ay of making such assessments is to 
take a given income level and estimate the share of total income received by people ith incomes belo 
that given level. The loer the share, the greater the degree of inequality in society ith respect to that 
group. If e do this for a number of different income levels, e can plot the share against them, giving 
the concentration curve for income. Figure 1 shos the concentration curves estimated for to 
alternative definitions of income. The purple curve summarises the distribution of original income (total 
net cash income, after housing costs, but excluding any disability-linked benefit income and the value of 
any state contribution to care costs); this definition ignores disability costs. The loer green 
concentration curve is estimated using the same definition of income, but expressed after estimated 
disability costs are met. Because the green curve is loer than the purple curve, the degree of income 
inequality is greater hen e take account of disability costs. This is because both the prevalence and 
severity of disability are higher among people ith lo incomes – a consequence of the ell-
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documented socio-economic disparities in health (see Marmot (2010). The impact of disability costs on 
inequality is large. For example, the 25 per cent of people ith loest incomes have an estimated 14 per 
cent share of total income if e ignore disability costs, compared ith only 7 per cent if e use income 
net of disability costs; the loer 50 per cent of people by income have a 32 per cent income share 
ignoring disability costs, but only a 24 per cent share if e take account of those costs. 
 
Figure 1: lloing for disability costs changes the picture of income inequality 
 
Based on analysis of data from over-65 respondents to the Family Resources Survey 2004/5 to 2007/8, uprated to 2015 
hat income level should e use as the poverty line?  
For most purposes, e measure income ithout subtracting disability costs but instead adjust the poverty 
line to reflect the increased living costs for people ith disabilities. Official poverty statistics (DP, 2015) 
use a relative poverty line defined as 60 per cent of median equivalised household income. Equivalisation 
is a process of adjusting for the economies of scale ithin households hich mean, for example, that a 
couple can achieve the same standard of living at loer total cost than to single people. But 
equivalisation does not take account of other differences in the cost of living for different types of 
household, particularly the large differences that may be caused by disability. If a non-disabled person 
requires a given income to avoid poverty, then someone ho has these extra costs ill need a larger 
income to avoid poverty. Consequently, an appropriately increased poverty line needs to be used to 
determine the poverty status of a household affected by disability. The required adjustment to the 
poverty line for any particular household ill depend on the severity of disability involved.  
 
The official 60 per cent median income poverty line is a idely used general-population criterion, but it is 
not universally accepted, is not tailored specifically to the older population, and is not the only official 
lo-income criterion in use. Pension Credit is made up of to parts – Guarantee Credit and Savings 
Credit. Guarantee Credit tops up eekly income if it is belo £155.60 (for single people) or £230.85 (for 
couples). Savings Credit is an extra payment for people ho saved some money toards their retirement, 
e.g. a pension. The Guarantee Credit level incorporates both an absolute judgement about the minimum 
socially acceptable income level for older people, and an equivalisation rule. The standard Guarantee 
Credit levels for single people and couples imply that living costs for a single person are 65 per cent of 
that for a couple. Yet a third official minimum income criterion is built into the local authority social care 
system; there, claimants must be left ith an income of at least 125 per cent of the Guarantee Credit 
level after contributing to the cost of social care.  
 
 benefit unit is defined as an adult living alone or a couple living alone or ith dependent children. To 
allo for a range of vies about hat constitutes a minimum acceptable income level for a benefit unit, 
e make our analysis using alternative poverty lines, each defined as a multiple (from 90 per cent to 140 
per cent) of the Guarantee Credit level.13 For benefit units affected by disability, e modify this poverty 
line by adding to it an estimate of the additional living costs generated by the disability in question. 
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Should e measure the extent of poverty or also the 
depth of poverty?  
Pensioner poverty is sometimes described as being ide but not deep – in other ords, many older 
people appear to fall belo the poverty line but fe are very far belo it. This vie has become more 
prominent during the recent recession, since the state pension and elfare benefits for older people 
have been better protected from government austerity measures than other parts of the benefit system. 
But public comment about the relatively favourable position of older people generally neglects the role 
of disability costs and, for that reason, is often misleading. The cost of care services can be extremely 
high if disability is severe, so an apparently high level of benefit income may be much less generous in 
reality. nother consequence of high care costs is that a system of public support for disabled people may 
be good at reducing the count of people belo the poverty line (even a disability-adjusted poverty line), 
yet still perform poorly in protecting people from very deep poverty.  
 
It is important to consider both the extent and depth of poverty.  measure of the extent of poverty tells 
us ho many people are poor.  more comprehensive measure that captures also the depth of poverty 
ill take into account both the number of people ho are poor, and ho far they are belo the poverty 
line. e use to complementary measures in our discussion; technical details are given in ppendix 5. 
• The headcount is the proportion of over-65s living in households ith income belo the (disability-
adjusted) poverty line. 
•  poverty measure first proposed by Foster, Greer and Thorbekke (1984) (knon as the FGT 
measure) modifies the headcount by giving much greater eight to people ho are far belo the 
poverty line than to those ho are close to it.14 
These to measures can give very different pictures of poverty and the difference beteen them 
highlights the importance of disability costs. Table 2 shos that, hen e express income net of 
estimated disability costs, both the extent and depth of measured poverty increase, but (except at very 
lo poverty lines) the depth of poverty increases more than its extent. For example, at the local authority 
social care income threshold of 125 per cent of the Guarantee Credit level, the estimated number of 
people in poverty rises by 72 per cent in the older population as a hole or nearly 110 per cent in the 
group affected by disability hen e allo for disability costs.15 But the FGT measure hich reflects both 
the extent and depth of poverty rises by over 280 per cent and 430 per cent respectively.16 The 
distinction beteen extent and depth of poverty ill also prove important hen e look at possible 
reforms to the current system in  section 5. 
 
Table 3: Disability costs increase the depth of poverty more than its extent 
Income concept 
Poverty measure 
Extent 
(headcount) Extent and depth (FGT) 
Poverty line as % of GC 
90%  100% 125% 90%  100% 125% 
Poverty among all individuals aged over 65* 
Unadjusted poverty line  4.6 7.0 28.6 .005 .007 .017 
Poverty line adjusted for disability costs 30.9 35.6 49.1 .038 .044 .065 
Poverty among individuals aged over 65* affected by disability 
Unadjusted poverty line 4.9 7.2 31.2 .006 .008 .018 
Poverty line adjusted for disability costs 47.8 53.8 64.6 .059 .069 .096 
nalysis of FRS data 2003/4-7/8, uprated to 2015. Income definition is full income including all public disability support, expressed 
after housing costs.  
* Single individuals aged 65 and over and individuals aged 65 and over ith a partner over state pension age. 
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4 Ho does the current system 
ork? 
Ho is public disability support distributed in relation 
to income? 
Figures 2 and 3 aim to sho here the recipients of public disability support tend to be located ithin 
the income distribution. e again use concentration curves, hich indicate the proportion of spending 
that goes to people belo any given position in the income distribution. To do this, e need to rank 
people according to their income, but it is important to do the ranking appropriately; otherise it is 
possible to arrive at quite misleading conclusions. 
 
In Figure 2, for example, the loer purple curve is based on a conventional definition of total net income 
after housing costs – so it includes the value of any disability benefit or care services received, but 
ignores the additional living costs of disability. The result is alarming – public disability support appears to 
be going to relatively ell-off people. For example, the poorest 50 per cent of the older population 
appear to be receiving only 30 per cent of public spending. But that ould be a seriously misleading 
conclusion, since it takes account of support received but ignores the additional living costs hich that 
support is designed to address. This highly distorted ay of depicting the distributional pattern of 
disability spending as unfortunately used in the influential anless et al. (2006) report hich floated 
the idea of reallocating spending aay from non-means-tested disability benefits to the social care 
system, and as repeated in the 2009 Green Paper (HMG, 2009) and the State of the Nation Report of 
the folloing year (HMG, 2010a). 
 
 rather better option is to rank people by the income they ould have in the absence of disability 
benefit and social care subsidy. That ranking leads to the upper green curve in Figure 2, hich suggests a 
slightly progressive distribution of disability support. For example, the poorest 50 per cent of people no 
appear to be receiving almost 70 per cent of disability support spending. lthough an improvement, this 
is also potentially misleading. By taking no account of either public disability support or the extra living 
costs hich that support is intended to address, it implicitly makes the implausible assumption that all 
disability costs are fully offset by hatever public support is received and those ho receive no support 
face no costs. 
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Figure 2: Including disability support in measured income ithout alloing for 
disability living costs gives a misleading picture of the distribution of public 
disability support 
 
Based on analysis of data from over-65 respondents to the Family Resources Survey 2004/5 to 2007/8, uprated to 2015 
But if it is possible to estimate individuals’ levels of disability cost, a much better analysis can be made. To 
capture the idea of need for support, the most appealing option is to rank people using a concept of 
income that represents the economic elfare that they ould have in the absence of any disability 
support. Income is then measured excluding any disability support received and also net of the additional 
living costs caused by disability. The result is the concentration curve in Figure 3, hich suggests that 
disability support is distributed very progressively, despite the lack of means testing in the /DL 
benefit programmes. ith income measured in this ay, the 50 per cent of older people ho ould be 
poorest in the absence of public disability support receive four-fifths of public disability support, and 
those ho ould be in the poorest 25 per cent receive over 60 per cent. 
 
Figure 3: Public spending on the older disabled population is seen to be distributed 
progressively hen income is measured net of estimated disability costs 
 
Based on analysis of data from over-65 respondents to the Family Resources Survey 2004/5 to 
2007/8, uprated to 2015 
e can look at the relationship of public disability support to income in more detail by examining average 
levels of receipt for means-tested and non-means-tested components of support. In Figure 4, e do this 
for receipt of three categories of support: (i) non-means-tested /DL; (ii) additional PC/HB/CTS 
amounts triggered by the /DL; (iii) the value of social care services paid for by the local authority. 
These average amounts are plotted for the five quintile groups of the distribution of original income net 
of disability costs. lthough /DL is not means-tested, there is a considerable degree of income 
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targeting for to reasons: there is a greater incidence of disability further don the socio-economic 
scale 17, and there is a greater take-up incentive for people on lo incomes. The additions to PC/HB/CTS 
triggered by receipt of /DL is still more strongly targeted as a consequence of their means-tested 
design. Local authority social care is also strongly targeted on income and is orth as much on average as 
/DL to those in the loest income quintile.  
 
Figure 4: Public disability support is progressively related to income18 
 
 
Ho is public disability support distributed in relation 
to severity of disability? 
One ould expect public support for people ith disabilities to be closely linked to severity of disability, 
given the disability assessment involved in the /DL and social care claim processes. The 2012 English 
Longitudinal Survey of geing (ELS) and the Family Resources Surveys both suggest that this is indeed 
the case. Table 4 shos the proportion of people receiving support, hich rises from very small 
proportions for people ith lo levels of disability, to over 50 per cent for those in the top fifth of 
disabled people ranked by (estimated) disability level.19 The imperfect reach of the system and the 
means-testing of local authority social care are the primary reasons for the surprisingly lo average level 
of support received by the severely disabled. 
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Table 4: The reach of the /DL and social care systems is strongly related to 
severity of disability, but is far from perfect 
Estimated disability level 
Receiving 
/DL 
Receiving 
local 
authority 
care 
Receiving /DL or 
local authority care 
nalysis of FRS data 2004/5 – 2007/8 1  
 None 0.9% 0.1% 0.9% 
 1st disability quintile 6% 1% 7% 
 2nd disability quintile 15% 2% 16% 
 3rd disability quintile 21% 3% 23% 
 4th disability quintile 38% 6% 39% 
 5th disability quintile 57% 13% 61% 
 ll ith disabilities 27% 5% 29% 
 ll  14% 3% 15% 
nalysis of ELS ave 6 data, 2012/13 2 
 None 2.1% 0.1% 2.2% 
 1st disability quintile 6% 0% 7% 
 2nd disability quintile 13% 1% 14% 
 3rd disability quintile 18% 4% 21% 
 4th disability quintile 35% 5% 38% 
 5th disability quintile 55% 21% 64% 
 ll ith disabilities 26% 6% 29% 
 ll 14% 3% 15% 
ll estimates eighted. 1 Based on 33,535 FRS respondents aged 65+, either living alone or ith partner over state pension age, ith 
no missing values on relevant variables. 2 Based on 5,174 core ELS members aged 65+ ith no missing values on relevant variables. 
Figure 5 shos that the progressive pattern of receipt of /DL and local authority-funded care by 
severity of disability is still more marked in terms of the cash value of support received, ith the average 
amount rising from a fe pounds a eek for moderate disability to around £150 a eek for the older 
population ith the highest level of disability.  
 
Figure 5: The amounts of support delivered by the /DL and social care systems 
are very strongly related to severity of disability 
 
Based on analysis of data from over-65 respondents to ELS ave 6 (2012), uprated to 2015 prices. 
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Figure 6 shos that the average levels of disability benefit support (including means-tested disability 
benefits – that is, the amounts of Pensions Credit, Housing Benefit and Council Tax Support hich are 
attributable to the Severe Disability ddition) fall far short of our estimates of average disability costs, 
especially at the highest levels of disability. dding in the value of local authority-funded social care closes 
the gap only slightly. Note that Figure 5 (based on individuals and including those ith no disability) uses 
ELS data, hereas Figure 6 (based on benefits units containing at least one disabled person aged 65+) 
uses FRS, so they are not directly comparable. In ELS, the relationship beteen the value of social care 
received and disability displays a steeper gradient than in the FRS but still suggests a substantial gap 
beteen state support and disability costs at the highest levels of disability. 
 
Figure 6: Levels of public support are far belo estimated disability costs on 
average 
 
Based on analysis of data on benefit units containing at least one disabled person aged 65 or over and no-one 
under pension age, from the Family Resources Survey 2004/5 to 2007/8, uprated to 2015 prices. 
 
The targeting of public disability support: unmet need 
The targeting efficiency of public spending has to aspects. On one hand, e ant to minimise the 
amount of need that remains unmet after the social care/disability benefit system has operated; on the 
other, e ant to avoid allocating resources to parts of the population here need is relatively light. 
Practical design or reform of a support system involves finding a balance beteen these to conflicting 
aims. Our analysis is designed to distinguish these to aspects of targeting (see ppendix 5 for technical 
details). 
 
The issue of unmet need is concerned ith the reach of the system – a combination of take-up decisions 
by potential claimants and the decisions made by adjudicators on the claims that are made. To make the 
concept of unmet need operational requires a orkable definition of need at the level of the individual. 
e define it here as the difference beteen income and the disability-adjusted poverty line (so ‘need’ is 
classified as zero for anyone above the poverty line). Under this definition, income is the total of 
resources available, including any disability benefit and the value of social or nursing care provided. It is 
helpful to split unmet need into to components – need hich is unmet because no support is provided; 
and need hich is unmet because the support hich is provided is insufficient to take the individual out of 
(disability adjusted) poverty. 
 
Figure 7 shos that the proportion of need hich the system succeeds in meeting is only around 30 per 
cent. The greatest source of unmet need – around 50 per cent of the total – is among people ho 
receive nothing at all from the system. The remaining 20 per cent or so is unmet need among people 
ho receive some support, but not enough to lift them out of poverty. The clear message from Figure 7 
is that the limited reach of the disability support system is the main source of targeting error in terms of 
unmet need. 
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Figure 7: The primary source of unmet need is the limited reach of the 
benefit/social care system 
 
 Based on analysis of data from over-65 respondents to the Family Resources Survey 2004/5 to 2007/8, uprated to 2015. 
The targeting of public disability support: use of 
resources 
The second aspect of targeting relates to the ay that public resources are used. If e vie the objective 
of the system as supporting disabled people ho are belo a (disability-adjusted) poverty line, it is natural 
to measure the extent of targeting errors in public spending as the proportion of spending that goes to 
people ho are either ithout disability or are above the disability-adjusted poverty line. Note that this is 
a very stringent criterion, hich conflicts ith the principle of universality underpinning the non-means-
tested /DL benefit programme. 
 
Figure 8 presents an analysis of spending on disability support for older people, for a range of alternative 
choices for the poverty line. Despite the conflict beteen the non-means-tested nature of /DL and 
the stringent poverty-oriented nature of this concept of targeting, e see surprisingly little targeting 
error. The first, red, part of each bar is the proportion of public resources going to people ith no 
evidence of any disability. It is a very small amount, so disability targeting seems very good. The second, 
grey, part of each bar is spending on people ho ould not qualify as poor even ithout any support. For 
all poverty lines, this share of spending is ell belo 20 per cent and only 10 per cent hen the poverty 
line is set at 125 per cent of the Guarantee Credit level. The third, blue, part of each bar represents a 
concept of ‘over-spending’ – the additional amount spent beyond the minimum needed to move any 
disabled person up to the disability-adjusted poverty line. 
 
The fourth and fifth parts of each bar represent the share of spending hich goes to move people ho 
ould be classified as poor in the absence of support toards, or all the ay to, the poverty line. 
Together, they represent nearly 60 per cent of total spending on disability support for older people if e 
use the Guarantee Credit level as the poverty line, and almost 70 per cent if e ere to dra the poverty 
line at 140 per cent of the Guarantee Credit level. For this range of choices for the poverty line, e find 
that over 80 per cent of public spending goes to disabled people ho ould be classed as poor ithout 
any public support. Given that /DL is not means-tested and that the local authority social care means 
test has a minimum income constraint set at 125 per cent of the Guarantee Credit, this constitutes a 
surprisingly efficient targeting regime. Nevertheless, there appears to be some scope for achieving better 
targeting by redesigning the benefit system to better align the amount of disability benefit ith the level 
of disability costs.   
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Figure 8: Despite the absence of a means test for /DL, ‘leakage’ of public 
resources to people ho are above the poverty line is modest 
 
Based on analysis of data from over-65 respondents to the Family Resources Survey 2004/5 to 2007/8, uprated to 2015 
ppendix 5 explains our measures of targeting errors in more detail. 
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5 Possibilities for reform 
t a time hen population ageing and increasing life expectancy are raising the burden of care costs, 
policy reform is alays on the agenda. Indeed, at the time of riting e are aaiting a public consultation 
on a possible reform that ould see responsibility for ttendance lloance transferred from the DP 
to local authorities (see DCLG, 2015) Various possibilities have been mooted, including diversion of 
resources for disability benefit into the social care budget; means-testing the /DL system; and 
making disability benefits liable to income tax. e ill not consider specific reforms in detail, since it is 
impossible to predict the exact form that reform ould take in practice. Instead, e consider three 
hypothetical reforms that ill serve to indicate the likely consequences of alternative broad directions of 
reform. These reform simulations are further developments of a subset of the reforms considered in our 
earlier paper (Hancock and Pudney, 2013). 
 
Importantly, e have kept each scenario ithin the current level of spending on public disability support 
for the older population (‘budget neutrality’). This focuses attention on the structure rather than scale of 
the disability support system and also reflects our vie of the political reality that there is little prospect 
of a significant increase in public spending per member of the disabled older population. Table 5 sets out 
the details of the three hypothetical reforms. ppendix 6 outlines ho the reforms are simulated. 
 
Table 5: Three hypothetical reforms to the disability benefit system illustrating the 
roles of reach and means-testing in the distributional impact of policy 
Reform Details 
Benefit rates affordable under 
revenue-neutrality (% of 
personal disability costs) 
Loest 70% of 
disability1 
Highest 30% 
of disability1 
1 
(i)  no change in take-up/claims assessment  
(ii) benefit rate proportional to disability costs, ith 
higher ratio for the 30% most disabled 
(iii) removal of DB means-testing (abolish SD + 
raise /DL) 
29% 59% 
2 
(i)  increased reach among the 30% most disabled 2  
(ii) benefit rate proportional to disability costs, ith 
higher ratio for the 30% most disabled 
(iii) removal of DB means-testing (abolish SD + 
raise /DL) 
19% 40% 
3 
(i)  increased reach among the 30% most disabled 2 
(ii) benefit rate proportional to disability costs, ith 
higher ratio for the 30% most disabled 
(iii) all DBs means-tested (/DL replaced ith 
higher SD) 
40% 82% 
 
1 mong those living in benefit units here at least one partner is disabled. 2 chieved by predicting receipt using an estimated logit 
model but increasing the coefficient on disability by 25 per cent. 
 
To means-test or not? 
Means-testing is often assumed to be an effective ay of improving benefit targeting. Instead, e find 
means-testing to be unnecessary if other design features of the system can also be varied. Reforms 1 
and 2 remove all means-testing from the disability benefit system – the Severe Disability ddition (SD), 
hich has the effect of raising entitlements to Pension Credit (PC), Housing Benefit (HB) and Council Tax 
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Support (CTS) for recipients of ttendance lloance/Disability Living lloance (/DL), is scrapped 
and the resulting savings are ploughed back into the universal /DL system. Both reforms tailor the 
rate structure of the universal benefit much more closely to actual disability costs (particularly for the 
most disabled). Reform 1 does this ithout increasing the reach of the system. In reform 2, e assume 
that some additional action is taken to increase delivery of benefit to the most severely disabled. Such 
actions could include government initiatives to promote exchange of information beteen the DP and 
local authorities or to raise aareness of the availability of support and help ith the claims process, 
although past evidence on the effectiveness of such initiatives is mixed. Note that, under revenue 
neutrality, improving the delivery of benefit entails some reduction in rates of benefit to remain ithin 
the fixed spending limit. 
 
Reform 3 takes the opposing route of scrapping the universal element and channelling all disability 
benefit through an increased SD in the means-tested PC, HB and CTS systems. e also assume 
increased reach among the most disabled. 
 
Compared ith the current system, reforms 1 and 2 increase slightly the proportion of need that is met 
– by 2 percentage points hen the Guarantee Credit level is used as the poverty threshold and by 1 
percentage point hen using 125 per cent of the Guarantee Credit level. The proportion of need that is 
met is increased more by reform 3 (full means-testing) – to 37 per cent (poverty threshold=GC) or 29 
per cent (125 per cent of GC) (Table 6). Hoever, the proportion of unmet need among disabled people 
ho do not receive benefits is loest under reform 2 (no means-testing and improved reach) falling from 
48 per cent (poverty threshold=GC) or 51 per cent (threshold = 125 per cent of GC) under the current 
system to 30 per cent or 33 per cent respectively. Full means-testing risks more need going completely 
unsupported by the disability benefits system.  
 
Table 6: Revenue neutral reforms could reduce unmet need 
Policy 
Poverty 
line Met need 
Unmet need 
Non-
recipients 
Recipients Total 
Current system GC 29% 48% 23% 71% 
125% GC 24% 51% 24% 75% 
Reform 1 (no DB means-
testing) 
GC 31% 48% 21% 69% 
125% GC 25% 51% 24% 75% 
Reform 2 (no DB means-
testing, improved reach) 
GC 31% 30% 39% 69% 
125% GC 25% 33% 42% 75% 
Reform 3 (full means-
testing, improved reach) 
GC 37% 48% 18% 63% 
125% GC 29% 48% 23% 71% 
Based on analysis of data from over-65 respondents to the Family Resources Survey 2004/5 to 2007/8, uprated to 2015. 
ll three reforms reduce the proportion of ‘excess’ spending taking people beyond the poverty line, from 
27 per cent (poverty threshold=100 per cent of GC) or 23 per cent (125 per cent GC) to 21–22 per 
cent or 19–20 per cent (Table 7). They also reduce the share of spending that takes poor disabled people 
up to the poverty threshold from around 20 per cent to about 14 per cent. The proportion of spending 
taking people toards but not up to the poverty line rises substantially under all three reforms. The 
largest rise occurs under reform 3 here this proportion is over 60 per cent compared ith 37 or 44 per 
cent under the current system. Full means-testing has the loest share of spending going to non-poor 
disabled at around 5 per cent compared ith 11–14 per cent under the pre-reform system.  
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Table 7: The share of spending going to non-poor disabled older people is loest 
under full means-testing but all reforms reduce the proportion of spending taking 
people above the poverty line 
Policy Poverty line Spending to 
non-
disabled 
Spending to 
non-poor 
Spending 
beyond 
poverty line 
Spending up 
to poverty 
line 
Spending 
under 
poverty 
line 
Current system GC 2% 14% 27% 20% 37% 
125% GC 2% 11% 23% 19% 44% 
Reform 1 (no DB 
means-testing) 
GC 0% 16% 22% 14% 47% 
125% GC 0% 13% 20% 14% 53% 
Reform 2 (no DB 
means-testing, 
improved reach) 
GC 0% 16% 22% 14% 47% 
125% GC 0% 13% 20% 14% 53% 
Reform 3 (full 
means-testing, 
improved reach) 
GC 0% 5% 21% 13% 60% 
125% GC 0% 4% 19% 14% 63% 
Based on analysis of data from over-65 respondents to the Family Resources Survey 2004/5 to 2007/8, uprated to 2015. 
The analysis in Tables 6 and 7 might suggest that means-testing is a good ay to reduce targeting errors. 
Hoever it does not tell us hether a large proportion of need going unmet represents a small amount 
of unmet need for a large number of people or a large amount of unmet need for a small number of 
people. If the objective is to reduce poverty, considering appropriate measures of poverty under different 
policy regimes provides a fuller picture of the effectiveness of each regime. Figure 9 compares poverty 
rates (headcount) and depth (FGT) under the current system of disability benefits and under the three 
hypothetical reforms for poverty lines ranging from 90 per cent of the Guarantee Credit level to 140 per 
cent of the Guarantee Credit level. There are three main findings. First, although the current system 
results in the loest rates of headcount poverty, it produces the deepest poverty levels. Second, to 
reduce the depth of poverty it is very important to extend the reach of benefits; reforms 2 and 3 reduce 
the depth of poverty much more than reform 1. Finally, comparing the to reforms under hich the 
reach of benefits is increased, the depth of poverty is only a little loer hen benefits are fully means-
tested than hen they are all non means-tested, despite the fact that higher rates of benefits can be 
afforded under full means-testing. Extending the reach of disability benefits among those ith the 
severest disabilities and hence the highest disability costs is essential to reducing the depth of poverty 
among disabled older people.  
 
Figure 9: Reforms to disability benefits could reduce the depth of poverty 
Extent of poverty (headcount) 
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Extent and depth of poverty (FGT) 
 
 
Based on analysis of data from over-65 respondents to the Family Resources Survey 2004/5 to 2007/8, uprated to 2015. 
 
hat ould it cost to eliminate poverty among disabled 
older people? 
Our analysis of unmet need gives a guide to the extra public resources that ould be needed to eliminate 
poverty among older people living ith disabilities in their on homes. There are to components to 
consider. The first is ho much more ould need to be spent to bring the incomes of those ho remain 
in poverty under the current system up to the poverty line. The second is ho much could be saved if all 
spending hich goes to non-disabled people, non-poor disabled people or brings poor disabled people 
above the poverty line ere eliminated. Subtracting the second from the first provides an estimate of the 
net cost of eliminating poverty if – a very important if – it ere possible to target resources perfectly. 
The anser clearly depends on the choice of poverty line.  
 
Figure 10 plots the to components and their net effect for the usual range of poverty lines. t a 
poverty line of the Guarantee Credit level, the net extra spending needed amounts to almost 100 per 
cent of current public spending on disability benefits and care for older people living in private 
households. In other ords spending ould need to double to eliminate poverty among older disabled 
people at this poverty line. If the chosen poverty line ere 125 per cent of the Guarantee Credit level, 
the increase ould need to be nearly 170 per cent. If it is not possible to target resources perfectly, the 
required increases in spending ould be higher.  
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Figure 10: Public spending on disability benefits and care ould need to at least 
double to eliminate poverty among older disabled people even ith perfect 
targeting 
 
 Based on analysis of data from over-65 respondents to the Family Resources Survey 2004/5 to 2007/8, uprated to 2015. 
 unitary or dual system of support? 
 
The idea of bringing together funding for disability benefits and funding for social care has been debated 
for some time. Most recently, the Barker revie (Commission on the Future of Health and Social Care in 
England, 2014a) recommended that ttendance lloance be brought ithin an integrated health and 
social care system to contribute to a more graduated pathay of support. Under this proposal, 
ttendance lloance ould no longer be administered by the Department for ork and Pensions but 
by a body (or bodies) responsible for commissioning health and social care, possibly by local health and 
ellbeing boards.  
 
The diversion of (some of) the resources currently used for disability benefits into the social care system 
as also suggested in the 2006 revie of social care (anless, 2006) and floated again in the 2009 
Social Care Green Paper (HMG, 2009). Subsequently the 2010 Social Care hite Paper (HMG, 2010b) 
ruled out, at least for the next Parliament, any reform of ttendance lloance (or the alternative 
benefit Disability Living lloance) to fund its proposed reform of social care. The Dilnot Commission on 
Funding Care and Support (Commission on Funding Care and Support, 2011) established by the 
Coalition Government formed in May 2010, considered the role of ttendance lloance. It concluded 
that ttendance lloance should remain a non-means-tested social security benefit but that it should 
be ‘rebranded’, an idea hich has been developed by Lloyd (2013).  
 
The consequences of combining /DL and care provision into a single fund cannot be assessed 
properly ithout considering systemic and individual uncertainties. The issue of uncertainty or risk has 
been largely ignored in the policy debate and the research hich informs the debate.  
 
Public scrutiny is an important factor promoting effective delivery of disability support, and that scrutiny 
may be more intense at the national than at the local level. The visibility of policy and the accountability 
of policy players are involved here. Central government departments like the DP are subject to close 
coverage by national nes media, hile coverage of local authorities’ decisions is more piecemeal. The 
accountability issue arises because central government funding decisions affect hat local authorities can 
achieve, ithout taking direct responsibility for the local consequences. Consequently, a concentration of 
responsibility for delivery in the hands of local bodies may increase the systemic risk of unevenly targeted 
delivery of support.  
 
Risk is also important at the individual level. ny system of claim assessment is necessarily uncertain, since 
it relies on officials’ judgements about disability and need – and the high success rate in claim appeals 
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procedures (see ppendix 1) demonstrates ho uncertain those judgements can be. Moreover, some 
people ith strong potential claims may not be aare of their potential eligibility, and so not make a claim 
(Pudney, 2009). Given these uncertainties, the existence of to parallel forms of support ith separate 
assessment procedures can be expected to reduce the risk of being missed completely by the system 
and, consequently, to reduce the number of people in severe need ho receive no support at all. 20 
 
These potential disadvantages of localisation should be set against any advantages of flexibility and 
administrative efficiency claimed for a unified, locally administered system of disability support. Overall, 
given our research findings, e see a distinct role for cash benefits like /DL ithin the system of 
public support for older disabled people. The delivery of benefits to those in need is far from perfect but 
e see no reason to believe that a unitary system of disability benefits and care service ould be better 
targeted, and there is a risk that it ould be considerably orse in terms of delivery of support to those in 
greatest need.  
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6 Extensions 
The UK picture 
Our analysis has focused on Great Britain here disability benefits are the responsibility of the DP. In 
considering reforms to disability benefits e have alloed for the effect of changes in an individual’s 
income from disability benefits on their entitlement to local authority-funded care and hence on their 
net income, measured to include the value of local authority-funded care. Our simulation evidence takes 
account of the major difference beteen Scotland, here entitlement to publicly funded personal care 
does not depend on income, and England and ales here it does (although ith some differences 
beteen England and ales in the guidance on ho local authorities should assess people’s 
contributions to their care costs). For largely technical reasons, our analysis does not cover Northern 
Ireland hich operates a similar means-test to England and ales for care provided in a care home, but 
here charges for care provided to people in their on home have traditionally been lo (La Centre 
(NI), 2015).  
 
The situation in England inevitably dominates any UK analysis in the sense that England accounts for the 
largest share of the UK population. People aged 65 and over in England account for 84–85 per cent of 
the UK and GB older populations. This is not to say that differences beteen the constituent countries 
are unimportant – and as more poers are devolved to them ith the potential for policies to diverge 
more, differences may become more pronounced. But it is very unlikely that the main messages of our 
analysis for Great Britain ould be changed if e ere able to extend it to include Northern Ireland. 
 
The care home populations 
Our analysis has been confined to the household population. There are a number of points that need to 
be made in considering ho the issues e have analysed apply to the care home population. The first is 
that the concepts of poverty and disability costs that e have used for the household population do not 
translate ell for use in the care home population. The means test for care home fees (or the hotel 
component of fees in Scotland) are designed to leave residents ith a small personal expenses alloance 
for meeting the costs of items and services that are not included in the care home fees. The adequacy of 
the level of the personal expenses alloances has been questioned and variations across care homes in 
hat is and is not provided ithin the care home fee may vary (Easterbrook, 2001; Griffiths, 2000) This is 
an area here further analysis is likely to be the most fruitful route to understanding ho to address 
poverty for older people living in care homes, rather than trying to incorporate the care home population 
directly ithin the frameork used in this paper. 
 
 second issue is the ay the benefits and care home funding systems ork together. Payments of , 
the care component of DL and the SD in Pension Credit cease if the recipient starts to get financial 
support from their local authority ith care home fees. In effect, local authorities ill pay the equivalent 
amount toards the recipient’s care home fees so there is no net effect on the care home resident but 
rather a cost is transferred from the DP to the local authority. One implication of this is that the 
reforms to disability benefits that e have examined ould have no effect on local authority-funded care 
home residents (effectively all residents in Scotland). Self-funded residents could be affected but since 
they are unlikely to be entitled to means-tested benefits, they ould be unlikely to benefit from the fully 
means-tested reform.  
 
Potential reforms to the care charging system 
e have considered hypothetical reforms to the disability benefits system but not reforms to the system 
of charging for care. Since care is received by far feer older people than receive disability benefits, the 
potential for reforms to the care charging system to affect poverty among older disabled people is much 
less than that of reforms to the disability benefit system. Nonetheless, variations in charging for care 
across countries of the UK and differences beteen care-charging means tests and means-tested 
benefits suggest areas that might be considered.  
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The main country differences in charging for care provided to people living in their on homes are: 
• Scotland does not charge for personal care.  
• ales has a maximum charge of £60 a eek. Its upper and loer capital limits are equal (implying no 
tariff income – see belo). It uses a 35 per cent rather than 25 per cent ‘buffer’ above the 
Guarantee Credit level and sets a minimum 10 per cent of the GC-level alloance for disability-
related expenditure  
• In Northern Ireland charging has historically been limited to home helps and meals-on-heels. 
• From 2020, there ill be a lifetime cap in England on individuals’ liability for care charges. The effects 
of this ill be mainly on people ho enter residential care (and then only those ho currently do not 
qualify for state help). The means test for care at home is not changing although the value of 
assessed need for home care ill count toards the cap. 
Some differences beteen the domiciliary care means tests and means-tested benefits are: 
• Tariff income: in England capital beteen the loer capital limit and the upper capital limit is assumed 
to generate £1 a eek of income for every £250 of capital beteen those limits. Since ales’ upper 
and loer capital limits coincide, there is no tariff income. In means-tested benefits, capital is 
assumed to generate income of £1 for every £500 of capital i.e. at half the rate used in the means 
test for home care in England. For Pension Credit there is no upper capital limit; tariff income is 
assumed to be generated on all capital above the loer limit. 
• Means tests for home care embody 100 per cent marginal ithdraal rates i.e. charges increase £ 
for £ as income increases once the threshold (GC level plus 25 per cent or 35 per cent for England 
and ales respectively) for charges has been reached. This contrasts ith Housing Benefit and 
Council Tax Support hich have ‘tapers’ so that benefit is ithdran by less than income increases. 
The Savings Credit21 component of Pension Credit involves a taper of 40 per cent. 
spects of the home care means test hich might therefore arrant debate, but here there is little or 
no research evidence, include: 
• the appropriate level of the so-called buffer above the ordinary GC level i.e. 25 per cent in England, 
35 per cent in ales, and hether it could be applied differently to avoid 100 per cent marginal 
ithdraal rates; 
• disability-related expenditure: ho it is established and treated in the means test for home care; 
• the capital limits and hat income is assumed to be generated from capital beteen the upper capital 
limits.  
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7 Ho robust is the evidence?  
lternative estimates of disability costs 
To investigate ho sensitive our findings are to levels of disability costs e repeated our analysis 
assuming that the relationship beteen disability costs and disability levels is unchanged but that disability 
costs are 35 per cent higher or loer than those used in our main analysis. Our conclusions on ho the 
current system orks are changed remarkably little by this sensitivity analysis. State support for disability 
costs in later life is still concentrated on poorer people hen income is measured net of disability costs. It 
still falls short of disability costs, especially at the most severe levels of disability, even if these costs are 
35 per cent loer than previously assumed. ltering assumed disability costs has some effect on 
targeting as measured by (un)met need and use of resources.  reduction in disability costs of 35 per 
cent increases the level of met need mainly by reducing the level of unmet need among those ho 
receive some support. For example at a poverty threshold equal to 100 per cent of the Guarantee Credit 
(GC) level, met need increases from 29 per cent (Table 6) to 36 per cent; unmet need among recipients 
of benefit falls from 23 per cent to 15 per cent. Corresponding changes at a threshold of 125 per cent 
of the GC level are a rise from 24 per cent to 36 per cent and a fall from 24 per cent to 18 per cent 
respectively.  35 per cent increase in disability costs has the opposite effect. t 100 per cent of GC met 
need falls to 23 per cent and unmet need among recipients rises to 28 per cent. Equivalent percentages 
at 125 per cent of GC are a fall to 20 per cent and a rise to 29 per cent. 
 
Higher or loer disability costs ould affect the levels of benefits, expressed as proportions of disability 
costs, hich could be afforded under the reforms examined in Section 5 ithin the current level of public 
spending on support for older people ith disabilities. Here e consider variations to the reforms in 
hich e increase or decrease the rates of disability benefits to retain budget neutrality under loer or 
higher disability costs. Higher benefit rates can be afforded if disability costs are loer; reduced benefit 
rates can be afforded if disability costs are higher. Under the reforms hich remove all means-testing in 
disability benefits (reforms 1 and 2) the rates of benefits that can be afforded for the highest 30 per cent 
of disabled older people remain at tice the level of those for the loest 70 per cent of disabled people. 
This is also the case here all disability benefits are means-tested and costs are 35 per cent higher than 
previously used. If disability costs are 35 per cent loer and all disability benefits are means-tested, 
benefit rates can be set at 100 per cent of disability costs, for all levels of disability. Details are set out in 
Table 8. 
 
Table 8: Hypothetical reforms to the disability benefit system under higher and 
loer levels of disability costs 
Reform Description 
Benefit rates affordable under revenue-neutrality (% of personal 
disability costs) 
Disability costs reduced 
 by 35% 
Disability costs increased by 35% 
Loest 70% 
of disability 
Highest 30% of 
disability 
Loest 70% 
of disability 
Highest 30% of 
disability 
1 No means-testing in 
DBs, no change in 
reach 
45% 90% 20% 40% 
2 No means-testing in 
DBs, improved reach  
30% 60% 14% 28% 
3 Full means-testing. 
improved reach  
100% 100% 30% 60% 
 
For full details of reforms see Table 5. 
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Comparisons of targeting among the different policy regimes are not affected greatly by altering 
disability costs and benefit rates. The exception is here disability costs are reduced by 35 per cent and 
disability benefits are fully means-tested. In this case, unmet need among benefit recipients falls from 15 
per cent under current policy, to just 4 per cent of total need if the poverty threshold equals the GC level 
(it does not fall to zero because some needs unrelated to disability may still be unmet, for example if 
Housing Benefit and Council Tax Support are not claimed or do not meet all housing costs). The 
proportion of spending on non-poor disabled people falls from 21 per cent (threshold=100 per cent GC 
level) or 15 per cent (125 per cent GC level) to 8 per cent or 6 per cent respectively. These relatively 
large differences are driven by the fact that at the loer levels of disability costs and under full means-
testing, benefit rates can be set at 100 per cent of costs for all disability levels.  
 
t 35 per cent loer disability costs, the choice of poverty threshold and of poverty measure becomes 
very important in assessing the performance of the different policy regimes (Figure 11). t thresholds 
belo about 110 per cent of the GC level, headcount poverty under reform 3 (full means-testing) is 
considerably loer than under reform 2 (no means-testing, improved reach). But using the FGT measure 
of the depth of poverty, there is much less to choose beteen these to reform options; indeed poverty 
is a little less under reform 2 at lo poverty thresholds. In contrast, at 35 per cent higher disability costs, 
reform 3 produces the loest FGT poverty levels at all thresholds. There is thus a suggestion here that 
given a fixed budget, the case for means-testing may be greater, the higher the overall level of disability 
costs.  
 
Finally, the general pattern of increases in public spending needed to eliminate poverty is not very 
sensitive to the reduced or increased levels of disability costs that e have examined. Hoever the level 
of necessary rises in spending are loer hen disability costs are assumed to be less and higher hen the 
costs are assumed to be more. For example at a poverty threshold of 100 per cent of the GC level, the 
net additional increase in spending needed to eliminate poverty falls from 97 per cent (see figure 10) to 
just 17 per cent if disability costs are 35 per cent loer than in our main analysis but rises to 183 per 
cent if disability costs are 35 per cent above our main analysis levels. Equivalent comparisons at 125 per 
cent of GC are a fall from 166 per cent to 80 per cent or a rise to 257 per cent. 
 
It is likely that our findings ould be more sensitive to changes in the relationships beteen disability 
costs and severity of disability, and beteen disability and income. lthough e have not examined this 
directly, in general the case for rebalancing rates of benefit to more closely match disability costs ill be 
greater, the steeper the gradient beteen disability costs and disability level. The case for a mostly non-
means-tested system ill be greater the steeper the (negative) gradient beteen disability levels and 
income; conversely the case for a more means-tested system ould be greater if there ere a less steep 
relationship beteen disability severity and income.  
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Figure 11: Extent and depth of poverty: disability costs 35 per cent loer 
Extent of poverty (headcount) 
 
 
 
Extent and depth of poverty (FGT) 
 
 
Based on analysis of data from over-65 respondents to the Family Resources Survey 2004/5 to 2007/8, uprated to 2015. 
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Figure 12: Extent and depth of poverty: disability costs 35 per cent higher 
 Extent of poverty (headcount) 
 
 
  
Extent and depth of poverty (FGT) 
 
 
Based on analysis of data from over-65 respondents to the Family Resources Survey 2004/5 to 2007/8, uprated to 2015. 
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8 Conclusions 
In this study e have used statistical analysis of to large-scale representative surveys to examine the 
effectiveness of the system of public support for older people ith disabilities. e have also used 
simulation of a number of hypothetical policy reforms to suggest promising ays to reform the system 
ithin the existing level of government spending. There are six main conclusions. 
  
1. Disability brings ith it additional living costs, hich can be very large – sometimes hundreds of 
pounds a eek. People ith disabilities often receive government support in the form of 
disability benefit, designed to meet part of those additional costs. If e include disability benefit in 
income but fail to make any alloance for the higher living costs that disability brings, then 
disabled people appear to be better off than they actually are. In the policy debate, e often see 
comparisons beteen the incomes of disabled and non-disabled people, or of the younger and 
older population (the latter have higher rates of disability). These comparisons are often made 
ithout any alloance for differences in living costs and are misleading because they make older 
disabled people seem better off relative to the rest of the population than they really are. 
2. Britain currently has a dual system of public support for older disabled people. Central 
government pays disability benefits (mainly ttendance lloance and Disability Living 
lloance), hile local authorities manage the provision of social care services. The to systems 
are quite separate and have little overlap, and it is sometimes suggested that they should be 
merged into a single system of disability support. hile this sounds neater and may save some 
administrative costs, it runs the risk that many more people than at present may miss out on 
government support completely. e think it is too big a risk to take ith such a vulnerable 
group. 
3. The present system of social care/disability benefit is quite good at using limited resources to 
minimise the number of older disabled people in poverty. But it is much less effective in 
protecting people from very deep poverty. The people most affected by this are those ith 
severe disability (and therefore high disability costs), especially those ho are unaare of, or not 
able to negotiate, the systems for claiming help ith their care needs.  
4. There are failures in the targeting of the current system – the system misses some people in 
great need and it spends some public money on people ith only moderate needs. But, in 
practice, no system of social support can avoid all such errors. Our findings suggest that the 
failure to meet severe need is a much bigger source of targeting error in the current system 
than is the spending of resources on the rong people.  
5. There is scope for improving the performance of the system of public support for older people 
ith disabilities, by spending the current budget for disability benefit in a more effective ay. 
lthough introducing means-testing for ttendance lloance or Disability Living lloance is 
often suggested, it is possible to achieve similar improvements in poverty outcomes in a fully 
means-tested or a fully non-means-tested version of the disability benefit system. The reason 
for this is that people ith lo incomes are more likely to be affected by severe disability, and 
also have a stronger need for support and are therefore more likely to claim support.  
6. Much more important than means-testing is the ability of the system to provide support to 
people living ith severe disabilities and facing very high disability costs. Effective reforms of the 
disability benefit system could achieve major reductions in the burden of deep poverty by doing 
to things:  
• adapting the amounts of benefit paid to claimants of ttendance lloance or Disability Living 
lloance to match the costs of disability more closely; 
 
• increasing the reach of the system, particularly among the most disabled, by increasing take-up 
of entitlements and/or improving the quality of initial adjudication of claims. 
 
 reform that achieved these objectives hile staying inside the current level of spending on disability 
benefits ould require a reduction in the average amounts paid to people ith less severe disability, 
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to pay for the increased levels of support for the most severely disabled, although it could also 
accommodate small amounts of support to an increased proportion of those ith modest disability 
levels. This seems a reasonable possibility to examine. 
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Notes  
1. See D. illetts. ‘Pensioners prosper, the young suffer. Britain’s social contract is breaking’, (The 
Observer, 26 October 2015) and illetts (2011). 
2. The system of disability benefits is administered separately in Northern Ireland but follos the 
British system very closely. The analysis in this paper relates to Great Britain unless otherise 
stated. 
3. There is also a national system of nursing care provided through the National Health Service. This 
is small in comparison to the benefit and social care systems. e take account of it in our analysis 
but do not discuss it. 
4. Source: DP tabulator tool (gov.uk/government/collections/dp-statistics-tabulation-tool; 
accessed 6 Jan 2016). 
5. Council Tax Support, as it is no knon, is administered by local authorities (councils). Our data 
comes from the period hen it as administered nationally and knon as Council Tax Benefit 
(CTB). For simplicity, e use the acronym CTS to refer to either system as appropriate. 
6. Source for numbers of social care recipients: Health and Social Care Information Centre (2015). 
7. Similar arrangements exist in ales and Scotland. In Northern Ireland social care is organised by 
health and social care trusts. 
8. Our analysis is based on data before pril 2015, and it remains to be seen ho the Care ct ill 
change the social care system in practice. 
9. ales has a maximum charge of £60 a eek (from pril 2015) hich applies if the means test 
ould otherise result in a charge higher than this. 
10.  change in the ay statistics on social care are reported to the Health and Social Care 
Information Centre means these figures are not directly comparable ith the 254,000 figure for 
2015 mentioned earlier. The 2015 figure excludes care provided on a short-term basis. 
11. See Tinkler and Hicks (2011), HMG (2012) and DP (2011) respectively. 
12. Curtis (2014) Tables 11.6 and 10.1 respectively. e assume that all nursing care reported in the 
FRS is provided under the NHS. 
13.  It is in any case possible to have an income above the GC level hen receiving means-tested 
benefits because certain sources of income are disregarded hen applying the means test and 
some components of means-tested benefits are not ithdran pound for pound as income rises. 
14. e use the square of the proportionate distance belo the poverty line, so a person ith income 
50 per cent of the poverty level is eighted 25 times more heavily than someone ith income 10 
per cent belo the poverty line.   
15. Calculated from Table 2 as (49.1-28.6)/28.6 and(64.6-31.2)/31.2 respectively. 
16. Calculated from Table 2 as (.065-.017)/.017 and(.096-.018)/.018 respectively. 
17. Unless there is a reversal in the recent trends toards an increasing socio-economic gradient in 
later life disability (Morciano et al., 2015b), the degree of implicit income targeting in /DL ill, 
if anything, increase in future. 
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18. The relatively large amount of nursing care apparently received by people in quintile 4 is 
essentially a ‘blip’. Nursing care is uncommon but relatively expensive, so large blips of this kind 
can occur purely by chance, as an outcome of random sampling. 
19. It should be borne in mind that e are using an approximate estimate of disability severity, so the 
small but positive rate of /DL receipt by people in the loer quintiles of the disability 
distribution may be due to errors in the classification of people into disability quintiles rather than 
delivery of benefit to ineligible people. 
20. Pudney et al., 2010; annex 1 gave an illustrative calculation shoing a plausible six-fold increase 
in the risk of receiving no support ith the adoption of a unitary assessment process. 
21. Hoever, the Savings Credit is being abolished for people ho reach state pension age after 
2016 as part of the state pension reforms due to come in then. 
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